کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5088527 | 1478316 | 2015 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine 533 CEO severance contracts for financial services firms from 1997 to 2007 and find that ex ante severance pay is positively associated with risk-taking after controlling for the incentive effects provided by equity-based compensation. We report a positive causal relation between the amount of severance pay and risk-taking using popular market-based risk measures as well as the distance-to-default and the Z-score. We also find that severance pay encourages excessive risk-taking using metrics such as tail risk and asset quality. Our results are consistent with the risk-shifting argument and provide support for recent reforms on severance pay in the financial sector.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 59, October 2015, Pages 111-126
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 59, October 2015, Pages 111-126
نویسندگان
Kareen Brown, Ranjini Jha, Parunchana Pacharn,