کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5088924 1478330 2014 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Mutual monitoring and corporate governance
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نظارت متقابل و حاکمیت شرکتی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 45, August 2014, Pages 255-269
نویسندگان
,