کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5090374 1375629 2011 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multiple directorships and acquirer returns
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Multiple directorships and acquirer returns
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper examines the impact of multiple directorships on stockholder wealth around the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. Grounded in agency theory, we argue that multiple directorships affect the quality of managerial oversight and thus influence agency conflicts in acquisition decisions. We show that acquiring firms where directors hold more outside board seats experience more negative abnormal returns. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend across the entire range of multiple directorships. Rather, the detrimental impact is significant only when the number of outside board seats surpasses a certain threshold. We interpret this result as suggesting that directors serving on multiple boards allow value-destroying acquisitions when they become too busy beyond a certain point, and the effect of directors' busyness on acquisition performance appears to be nonlinear. We employ several alternative definitions of directors' busyness and obtain consistent results.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 34, Issue 9, September 2010, Pages 2011-2026
نویسندگان
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