کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5091109 1375660 2008 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Providers' affiliation, insurance and collusion
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Providers' affiliation, insurance and collusion
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the benefits for an insurance company to develop its own network of service providers when insurance fraud is characterized by collusion between policyholders and providers. In a static framework without collusion, exclusive affiliation of providers allows insurance companies to recover some market power and to lessen competition on the insurance market. This entails a decrease in the insured's welfare. However, exclusive affiliation of providers may entail a positive effect on customers' surplus when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated relationship. In particular, while insurers must cooperate to retaliate against a fraudulent provider under non-exclusive affiliation, no cooperation is needed under exclusive affiliation. In that case, an insurer is indeed able to reduce the profit of a malevolent provider by moving to collusion-proof contracts when collusion is detected, and this threat may act as a deterrent for fraudulent activities. This possibility may supplement an inefficient judicial system: it is thus a second-best optimal anti-fraud policy.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 32, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 170-186
نویسندگان
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