کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5092728 | 1375952 | 2006 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Kleptocracy and corruption
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we develop a model that analyzes the competition and strategic interactions between a kleptocratic ruler and his officials in rent seeking. The ruler implements anti-corruption measures, which include wage incentives and monitoring, to discourage his opportunistic officials from seeking bribes to obtain more rent for himself. We show that the ruler pays an efficiency wage to his officials to eliminate corruption if and only if monitoring is relatively effective. We also demonstrate that, in a proprietary state, the ruler always sets an inefficiently high tax rate in order to discourage the officials from demanding bribes. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (1) (2006) 57-74.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics - Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 57-74
Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics - Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 57-74
نویسندگان
C. Simon Fan,