کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5092729 | 1375952 | 2006 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Growing apart: The division of labor and the breakdown of informal institutions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we model the co-evolution of the division of labor and informal institutions based on three assumptions. First, informal institutions lower coordination costs among specialists, which increases the equilibrium division of labor. Second, advances in the division of labor increase the size of interpersonal trading groups and thereby undermine the game theoretic basis of informal institutions. Finally, the collective nature of informal institutions implies that they are undervalued in private decision making. Together these assumptions imply that the equilibrium division of labor is too high from a social perspective. Consequently, the economy has greater than optimal complexity and grows at a higher than optimal rate of growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (1) (2006) 75-91.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics - Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 75-91
Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics - Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 75-91
نویسندگان
Lewis S. Davis,