کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099602 | 1377018 | 2007 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies optimal pay-as-you-go social security with investment externalities, positive bequests and endogenous fertility. With an investment externality, a competitive solution without social security suffers from under-investment in capital and over-reproduction of population. We show the existence of time-consistent optimal social security that improves welfare by reducing fertility and increasing capital intensity. We also illustrate numerically that a small degree of this externality can justify the observed high ratios of social security spending to GDP.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 31, Issue 11, November 2007, Pages 3545-3567
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 31, Issue 11, November 2007, Pages 3545-3567
نویسندگان
Jie Zhang, Junsen Zhang,