کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099948 | 1478708 | 2006 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We propose an equilibrium concept (the recursive Nash bargaining solution) that describes the outcome of repeated negotiations between two rational agents under the assumptions that the state of the economic system under consideration changes according to the actions of the players and that neither party can make binding commitments to future behavior. This equilibrium is dynamically consistent but typically not Pareto-efficient. As an application, we compute the recursive Nash bargaining solution in a model of two heterogeneous agents bargaining over the use of a productive asset with constant gross rate of return and study how the time-preference rates and the elasticities of substitution affect the solution.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 30, Issue 12, December 2006, Pages 2637-2659
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 30, Issue 12, December 2006, Pages 2637-2659
نویسندگان
Gerhard Sorger,