کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100109 | 1478736 | 2017 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اصطلاحات جستجو، مکانیزم های رقابت و تقسیم بندی بهینه بازار
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call “joint concavity.” Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 453-473
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 453-473
نویسندگان
Xiaoming Cai, Pieter A. Gautier, Ronald P. Wolthoff,