کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100111 | 1478736 | 2017 | 28 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
استدلال القایی به جلو و اعتقادات صحیح
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
All equilibrium concepts implicitly make a correct beliefs assumption, stating that a player believes that his opponents are correct about his first-order beliefs. In this paper we show that in many dynamic games of interest, this correct beliefs assumption may be incompatible with a very basic form of forward induction reasoning: the first two layers of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; Battigalli, 1997, epistemically characterized by Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). Hence, forward induction reasoning naturally leads us away from equilibrium reasoning. In the second part we classify the games for which equilibrium reasoning is consistent with this type of forward induction reasoning, and find that this class is very small.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 489-516
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 489-516
نویسندگان
Andrés Perea,