کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5109320 1482839 2018 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Inside directors and the underinvestment of financial slack towards R&D-intensity in high-technology firms
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مدیران داخلی و سرمایه گذاری کم اسلگ مالی به سمت تحقیق و توسعه شدید در شرکت های فن آوری بالا
کلمات کلیدی
تئوری آژانس؛ افسردگی؛ خسارت مالی؛ مدیران داخلی؛ شدت تحقیق و توسعه ؛ سرمایه گذاری کم
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
چکیده انگلیسی
Agency theory emphasizes the role of outside directors in mitigating free cash flow (FCF) problems, such as overinvesting FCF's into negative NPV R&D projects. In this paper we draw on and extend agency theory to argue that the underinvestment of financial slack towards a persistently high R&D-intensity is actually a greater problem for high-tech firms. Specifically, we claim that inside directors play a critical role for the board in safeguarding R&D investment by monitoring the CEO, and mitigating informational asymmetries for independent directors. We test our theory using a panel-data set of S&P 1500 firms in R&D-intensive industries from 1997 to 2007. Our empirical analysis reveals that inside directors positively influence the relationship between financial slack and R&D-intensity, and that their ability to ensure cash holdings are used to preserve R&D matters the most during periods of financial distress.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 82, January 2018, Pages 192-201
نویسندگان
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