The UK Buncefield incident – The view from a UK risk assessment engineer

The large release of petrol from a storage tank at the Buncefield storage site in December 2005 and subsequent explosion of the extensive vapour cloud formed has resulted in significant learning for operators of large flammable liquid storage systems. This paper presents the personal views of the key aspects of this learning that are pertinent to those who undertake hazard identification and risk assessment studies of such sites, either as part of the safe design of a new installation or as part of a periodic review of the safety of an existing installation. These views have arisen from involvement as an expert witness in the legal action brought against the fuel storage operators at Buncefield in December 2005 under UK Civil Law and also from the experience of providing consultancy support to operators of similar storage systems pre and post the Buncefield incident. The view is from an engineer typically being asked to support operations using recognized assessment methods and practices to develop safety cases and design safety reviews. This paper is aimed at those who would need to identify and assess the fire and explosion hazards and risks from Buncefield-type installations, i.e. any large flammable liquid storage systems at or near atmospheric pressure.The paper covers:-the lack of awareness, prior to the Buncefield incident, of previous incidents at similar installations involving explosions and fires from loss of containment of significant quantities of petrol and its implications-important factors to consider in identifying and assessing fire and explosion risks-important aspects of design and operation for risk mitigation.