کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7356545 | 1478284 | 2018 | 51 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Skill or effort? Institutional ownership and managerial efficiency
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مهارت یا تلاش؟ مالکیت نهادی و کارایی مدیریتی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Using a sample of U.S. firms during the 1989-2015 period, we study whether the efficiency with which managers generate revenue is sensitive to monitoring by institutional shareholders. We find that institutional ownership is positively related to managerial efficiency. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 Index threshold and suggests that the positive effect of institutional ownership on managerial efficiency is causal. Furthermore, we document that monitoring by institutions helps improve managerial efficiency, and that an exogenous increase in institutional ownership leads to higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Finally, we find consistent results after excluding from our sample forced CEO turnovers, suggesting that institutional shareholders force incumbent managers to exert greater effort rather than influence the replacement of less efficient CEOs. Taken together, our findings highlight the important role played by institutional shareholders in getting the most out of corporate executives.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 91, June 2018, Pages 19-33
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 91, June 2018, Pages 19-33
نویسندگان
Ghasan A. Baghdadi, Ishaq M. Bhatti, Lily H.G. Nguyen, Edward J. Podolski,