کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7357275 | 1478428 | 2018 | 54 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Does improved disclosure lead to higher executive compensation? Evidence from the conversion to IFRS and the dual-class share system in China
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Does improved disclosure lead to higher executive compensation? Evidence from the conversion to IFRS and the dual-class share system in China Does improved disclosure lead to higher executive compensation? Evidence from the conversion to IFRS and the dual-class share system in China](/preview/png/7357275.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Exploiting an exogenous disclosure rule change and the unique dual-class share system in China, this study tests whether improved information disclosure leads to higher executive compensation. Consistent with the theoretical prediction in Hermalin and Weisbach (2012), we find that after China adopted a set of tightened accounting and auditing standards in 2007, executive compensation increased by about 15% relative to the control firms. Our results support the argument that, because the better monitoring allowed by increased disclosure tends to affect managers adversely, managerial compensation rises as a compensating differential.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 48, February 2018, Pages 244-260
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 48, February 2018, Pages 244-260
نویسندگان
Jun Lu, Zhen Shi,