کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359002 | 1478728 | 2018 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مکانیسم تطبیق پایدار به وضوح استراتژیک نیست
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof for any side of the market, a stronger incentive property than strategy-proofness that was introduced by Li (2017). A stable mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof for applicants is introduced for the case in which agents on the other side have acyclical preferences.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 177, September 2018, Pages 405-425
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 177, September 2018, Pages 405-425
نویسندگان
Itai Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski,