کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7359870 1478753 2014 32 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility
چکیده انگلیسی
Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze a particular market failure that leads to inefficiently low fertility in equilibrium. The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no claim on their childrenʼs income, the private benefit from producing a child can be smaller than the social benefit. We analyze an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with fertility choice and parental altruism. Ownership is modeled as a minimum constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using the efficiency concepts proposed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt [38], we find that whenever the transfer floor is binding, fertility choices are inefficient. Second, we show that the usual conditions for efficiency are not sufficient in this context. Third, in contrast to settings with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to implement efficient allocations. To achieve an efficient outcome, government transfers need to be tied to fertility choice.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 150, March 2014, Pages 551-582
نویسندگان
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