کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7359882 1478753 2014 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
توابع زینتی و مجموعه های قوی تعادل
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 150, March 2014, Pages 866-877
نویسندگان
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