کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7367767 1479257 2016 8 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بازی های دو نفره ای با مبلغ صفر با تفاضل ناپذیر و نظارت خصوصی
کلمات کلیدی
بازی های تکراری دو نفره بازی نهایی،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player's payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player's conjecture about his opponent's action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 63, March 2016, Pages 131-138
نویسندگان
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