Learning monopolies with delayed feedback on price expectations

• We analyze a price learning process of a bounded rational monopoly with delay price information.
• It is possible to stabilize the equilibrium that is unstable in the one delay model.
• Complex dynamics involving chaos can emerge in the two delay model.
• Alternations of stability and instability (i.e., stability switches) occurs repeatedly.

We call the intercept of the price function with the vertical axis the maximum price and the slope of the price function the marginal price. In this paper it is assumed that a monopolistic firm has full information about the marginal price and its own cost function but is uncertain on the maximum price. However, by repeated interaction with the market, the obtained price observations give a basis for an adaptive learning process of the maximum price. It is also assumed that the price observations have fixed delays, so the learning process can be described by a delayed differential equation. In the cases of one or two delays, the asymptotic behavior of the resulting dynamic process is examined, stability conditions are derived. Three main results are demonstrated in the two delay learning processes. First, it is possible to stabilize the equilibrium which is unstable in the one delay model. Second, complex dynamics involving chaos, which is impossible in the one delay model, can emerge. Third, alternations of stability and instability (i.e., stability switches) occur repeatedly.