کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
8953554 | 1645948 | 2019 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Preventing Sybil attacks in P2P file sharing networks based on the evolutionary game model
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی کامپیوتر
هوش مصنوعی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
In cooperative Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, a number of users, called Free-riders, try to receive service from others without cooperating with them. Some others, called Sybil nodes, break the rules of the system by colluding and showing fake identities. P2P networks are highly vulnerable to these attacks. In previous research, no method has been suggested to counter these two attacks simultaneously. In the proposed method, a new centrality relationship has been used in the incentive mechanism to deal with both problems at the same time. In this regard, the more varied the nodes receiving service from a peer are, the better the peer reputation will be. The results show that the longer the network life goes on, the more free-riders are detected, and the number of services delivered to the collusive nodes will also be reduced.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Information Sciences - Volume 470, January 2019, Pages 94-108
Journal: Information Sciences - Volume 470, January 2019, Pages 94-108
نویسندگان
Morteza Babazadeh Shareh, Hamidreza Navidi, Hamid Haj Seyyed Javadi, Mehdi HosseinZadeh,