کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956565 | 928475 | 2015 | 33 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Efficient assignment with interdependent values
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تخصیص کارآمد با ارزش های متقابل
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study the “house allocation” problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex-post incentive compatible, and the only mechanism that is ex-post group incentive compatible is constant across states. By contrast, we demonstrate that a Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism exists in the two agent house-allocation problem, given sufficient congruence of preferences and the standard single crossing property. We also show that (approximate) Pareto efficiency can be achieved once we relax the incentive compatibility requirements to approximate ex-post incentive compatibility or Bayesian incentive compatibility.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 158, Part A, July 2015, Pages 54-86
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 158, Part A, July 2015, Pages 54-86
نویسندگان
Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima,