کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956773 | 928491 | 2013 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one](/preview/png/956773.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
I consider whether the agentsʼ reluctance to make a large lie is helpful for the rule designer to construct a nonmanipulable rule. For this purpose, I study an axiom, called AM-proofness, saying that manipulation cannot occur through preferences adjacent to the sincere one. Through examples, I give rationales for AM-proofness. My main result is a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of AM-proofness and strategy-proofness. I show that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the universal domain and the domain of single-peaked preferences. Over such domains, all results about strategy-proofness can be restated with AM-proofness.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 259-278
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 259-278
نویسندگان
Shin Sato,