کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
956871 928496 2010 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
چکیده انگلیسی

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 2241–2259
نویسندگان
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