کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956925 | 928498 | 2012 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A bank runs model with a continuum of types
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agentsʼ behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 5, September 2012, Pages 2040-2055
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 5, September 2012, Pages 2040-2055
نویسندگان
Yaron Azrieli, James Peck,