کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957141 | 928511 | 2006 | 35 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price–bundle pair of his choice. We identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules. We then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the nn-object case. We use these results to characterize environments, mainly distributions of valuations, where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 127, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 1–35
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 127, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 1–35
نویسندگان
Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent,