کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957189 | 928513 | 2012 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games](/preview/png/957189.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors. The stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a Rawlsian SWF for a common class of utility functions. In contrast to previous analyses, the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 364–381
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 364–381
نویسندگان
Jonathan Newton,