کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957194 928514 2013 32 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities. We show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. We also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 871–902
نویسندگان
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