کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957363 | 928523 | 2007 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets](/preview/png/957363.png)
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748–780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 587–600