کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957395 928524 2012 13 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
چکیده انگلیسی

We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions, exchange money with each other, and perfectly coordinate their actions. Our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results (such as those of Green and Laffont, and of Schummer) by providing the players with a richer set of strategies, making it dominant for every coalition C to instruct each of its members to report truthfully not only his own valuation, but also his belonging to C. Our mechanism is coalitionally rational, which implies being individually rational for independent players.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 1300–1312
نویسندگان
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