کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957524 | 928532 | 2007 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives ‘in the shadow’ of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a ‘winning coalition’ supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: what influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity. In this setting a natural extension of Nash's solution is characterized.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 291–305
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 291–305
نویسندگان
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano,