کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957578 928534 2008 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Role of honesty in full implementation
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Role of honesty in full implementation
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents’ preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. We show that the presence of such preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree of the preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail free and involve only small fines.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 139, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 353–359
نویسندگان
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