کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957798 | 928576 | 2006 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Professional advice
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Professional advice Professional advice](/preview/png/957798.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider sequential communication by experts with conditionally independent signals. In the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 126, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 120–142
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 126, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 120–142
نویسندگان
Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen,