کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
962504 | 930116 | 2013 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
When do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union?
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: When do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union? When do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union?](/preview/png/962504.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper offers a framework to study strategic interactions between private players, national fiscal authorities and a common central bank in monetary unions. We establish general conditions, in terms of restrictions on spillover effects of actions by private and public players, under which games that differ in the degree of cooperation and commitment can admit the same equilibrium outcome. We use these conditions to characterize benchmark results on the irrelevance of cooperation and commitment established in recent literature. Moreover, we show for a general setting, in which the benchmark results do not apply, that gains from fiscal cooperation depend on the number of countries and increase as this number gets larger.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 91, Issue 2, November 2013, Pages 252-262
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 91, Issue 2, November 2013, Pages 252-262
نویسندگان
Hubert Kempf, Leopold von Thadden,