کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
964920 | 930664 | 2014 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• What is the effect on welfare of a cut in unemployment benefits and firing costs?
• Welfare is reduced by lower firing costs, unlike for unemployment benefits.
• The result is driven by the wage channel.
• The spillover effect of this channel on welfare depends on the monetary dimension.
• Pre-announcement of reforms drives welfare effects to zero.
This paper shows that a reform aimed at improving labor market flexibility is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. We adopt a New-Keynesian model enriched with search and matching frictions. We investigate the effects of institutional labor market reforms, described by a permanent change in firing costs and unemployment benefits. Improving labor market flexibility by cutting unemployment benefits is welfare-enhancing for households. On the contrary, cutting firing costs reduces welfare. We argue that real wage dynamics play a crucial role in the results. Furthermore, welfare effects tend to zero when the reform is pre-announced.
Journal: Journal of Macroeconomics - Volume 39, Part A, March 2014, Pages 156–170