کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
965175 1479259 2015 8 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
دستکاری در بازی ها با سطوح مختلف خروجی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی
In (j,k)-games each player chooses amongst j ordered options and there are k possible outcomes. In this paper, we consider the case where players are assumed to prefer some outcomes to others, and note that when k>2 the players have an incentive to vote strategically. In doing so, we combine the theory of cooperative game theory with social choice theory, especially the theory of single-peaked preferences. We define the concept of a (j,k)-game with preferences and what it means for it to be manipulable by a player. We also consider Nash equilibriums with pure strategies for these games and find conditions that guarantee their existence.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 61, December 2015, Pages 144-151
نویسندگان
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