کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
965677 | 930831 | 2009 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Interaction sheaves on continuous domains
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 45, Issue 11, 1 December 2009, Pages 708-719
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 45, Issue 11, 1 December 2009, Pages 708-719
نویسندگان
Joseph Abdou, Hans Keiding,