کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966414 | 1479278 | 2008 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game](/preview/png/966414.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We extend the analysis of competitive outcomes in TU market games of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1975. Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 229-237] in two ways. First, our representing economies are coalition production economies. Second, and more importantly, our analysis holds for arbitrary TU games. By adopting the C-stable set of Guesnerie and Oddou [Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C., 1979. On economic games which are not necessarily superadditive. Economics Letters 3, 301-306], renamed c-core in our paper, we are able to characterize competitive outcomes even in games with empty core. As competitive outcomes are associated with specific coalition structures, our main result provides an endogenous determination of coalition building and shows that the c-core of any TU game coincides with the set of competitive outcomes of the corresponding coalition production economy.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issues 7â8, July 2008, Pages 853-860
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issues 7â8, July 2008, Pages 853-860
نویسندگان
Ning Sun, Walter Trockel, Zaifu Yang,