کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966755 | 931102 | 2010 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects](/preview/png/966755.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms' incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 46, Issue 5, 20 September 2010, Pages 855-866
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 46, Issue 5, 20 September 2010, Pages 855-866
نویسندگان
Rabah Amir, Jim Y. Jin, Michael Troege,