کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970477 | 1479555 | 2009 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Enforcement of exogenous environmental regulation, social disapproval and bribery
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. An enforcement officer who has social ties with the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if he/she enforces the regulation zealously. The officer, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derive results for situations where the officer is passively and actively involved in the bribery.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: The Journal of Socio-Economics - Volume 38, Issue 6, December 2009, Pages 940–945
Journal: The Journal of Socio-Economics - Volume 38, Issue 6, December 2009, Pages 940–945
نویسندگان
Wisdom Akpalu, Håkan Eggert, Godwin K. Vondolia,