کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9727372 | 1479753 | 2005 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a two-sided matching model where agents' preferences are a function of the types of their potential mates. Matching rules are manipulated by type misrepresentation. We explore the implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria. Although direct type pretension mechanisms rule out “bad” equilibria, the existence of equilibrium cannot be generally guaranteed. However, taking G as the discrete partition, the individually rational matching correspondence is partially implementable in Nash equilibria. On the other hand, incorporating a certain degree of hypocrisy in the mechanism, i.e., allowing agents to pretend different types to different potential mates, ensures the full implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 3, November 2005, Pages 304-317
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 3, November 2005, Pages 304-317
نویسندگان
Ä°pek Ãzkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver,