کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972786 | 932683 | 2009 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Committees and reciprocity
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we examine the impact of reciprocal motives on decision-making in a committee. We show that each strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium without reciprocity also represents an equilibrium under reciprocity. Under reciprocity, additional equilibria may exist. All of them imply lower material payoffs and lower overall utility for a large majority of members compared to equilibria that also represent equilibria without reciprocity. We discuss mechanisms such as incentive contracts that may eliminate the negative effects of reciprocity. In a dynamic framework we show that “psychological logrolling equilibria” may exist, where some agents perceive others as kind and therefore accept projects that are detrimental to themselves but beneficial to others.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 57, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 26-47
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 57, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 26-47
نویسندگان
Volker Hahn, Felix Mühe,