کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972828 | 932691 | 2011 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.
Research Highlights
► We study the relation between career concerns and corruption.
► We draw on extensive information on the performance and official evaluation of referees as well as hard evidence on match rigging in the Italian football league.
► We find that referees involved in match rigging had career advances and their official evaluation was not negatively affected by the performance during rigged matches.
► Career concerns may be a substitute for financial bribes.
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 18, Issue 3, June 2011, Pages 349–359