کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972862 932696 2010 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary
چکیده انگلیسی

In this article, we show that the presence of the judiciary in the background of labour relationships is not neutral within these relations: its potential intervention in case of an ex-post layoff and conflict over the severance payment can promote ex-ante efficient specific investment decisions. This ability to promote efficiency depends on the judiciary's aptitude to balance out the parties' ex-post bargaining powers. Interestingly one of the results shows that, if workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations is low, which implies that they expect low returns from continuing the relationships, an increase in the exogenous layoff probability should lead judges to be less lenient towards them.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 17, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 424–433
نویسندگان
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