کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
973352 | 932804 | 2007 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit](/preview/png/973352.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 54, Issue 2, September 2007, Pages 152-175
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 54, Issue 2, September 2007, Pages 152-175
نویسندگان
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme,