کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10677545 1012356 2016 13 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مدیریت تدارکات پویا توسط مزایده های معکوس با هزینه های نصب ثابت و اهرم های فروش
کلمات کلیدی
استراتژی تدارک دینامیک، حراج معکوس، اهرمهای فروش برنامه ریزی پویا تصادفی،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه سایر رشته های مهندسی مکانیک محاسباتی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we study a dynamic procurement problem for a retailer with fixed setup costs and sales levers (such as pricing, advertising, etc.). The retailer runs a reverse auction with a procurement contract in each period. A number of potential suppliers bid for this contract, and the winner is the supplier with the highest bid and is given the decision right for the quantity produced and delivered. The demand is either realized by selling via Internet auctions and unmet demand is lost, or is a price-sensitive nonnegative random variable and all shortages are backlogged. We show the existence of the retailer's optimal procurement contract, under which the suppliers' Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is (q(·),Q(·)), similar to the classic (s, S) policy for the retailers in dynamic inventory control problems. However, the (q(·),Q(·)) strategy here is for the suppliers and is realized through the suppliers' marginal production costs and so consists of two random variables for the retailer.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Applied Mathematical Modelling - Volume 40, Issue 4, 15 February 2016, Pages 3049-3061
نویسندگان
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