Beyond the pineal gland assumption: A neuroanatomical appraisal of dualism in Descartes’ philosophy

ObjectiveThe problem of the substantial union of the soul and the body and therefore the mechanisms of interaction between them represents the core of the Cartesian dualistic philosophy. This philosophy is based upon a neuroanatomical obvious misconception, consisting mainly on a wrong intraventricular position of the pineal gland and its capacity of movement to act as a valve regulating the flow of animal spirits. Should we consider the Cartesian neurophysiology as a purely anatomical descriptive work and therefore totally incorrect, or rather as a theoretical conception supporting his dualistic philosophy?MethodFrom the various pre-Cartesian theories on the pineal organ, we try to explain how Descartes used his original conception of neuroanatomy to serve his dualistic philosophy. Moreover, we present an appraisal of the Cartesian neuroanatomical corpus from an anatomical but also metaphysical and theological perspectives.ResultsA new interpretation of Descartes’ writings and an analysis of the secondary related literature shed the light on the voluntary anatomical approximations aiming to build an ad hoc neurophysiology that allows Descartes’ soul–body theory.ConclusionBy its central position within the brain mass and its particular shape, the pineal gland raised diverse metaphysical theories regarding its function, but the most original theory remains certainly its role as the seat of soul in René Descartes’ philosophy and more precisely the organ where soul and body interact. The author emphasizes on the critics raised by Descartes’ theories on the soul–body interaction through the role of the pineal gland.