Hidden attribute-based signatures without anonymity revocation

We propose a new notion called hidden attribute-based signature, which is inspired by the recent developments in attribute-based cryptosystem. With this technique, users are able to sign messages with any subset of their attributes issued from an attribute center. In this notion, a signature attests not to the identity of the individual who endorsed a message, but instead to a claim regarding the attributes the underlying signer possesses. Users cannot forge signature with attributes which they have not been issued. Furthermore, signer remains anonymous without the fear of revocation, among all users with the attributes purported in the signature.After formalizing the security model, we propose two constructions of hidden attribute-based signature from pairings. The first construction supports a large universe of attributes and its security proof relies on the random oracle assumption, which can be removed in the second construction. Both constructions have proven to be secure under the standard computational Diffie–Hellman assumption.