کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
432765 689063 2012 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An efficient incentive scheme with a distributed authority infrastructure in peer-to-peer networks
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر نظریه محاسباتی و ریاضیات
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
An efficient incentive scheme with a distributed authority infrastructure in peer-to-peer networks
چکیده انگلیسی

Today’s peer-to-peer networks are designed based on the assumption that the participating nodes are cooperative, which does not hold in reality. Incentive mechanisms that promote cooperation must be introduced. However, the existing incentive schemes (using either reputation or virtual currency) suffer from various attacks based on false reports. Even worse, a colluding group of malicious nodes in a peer-to-peer network can manipulate the history information of its own members, and the damaging power increases dramatically with the group size. Such malicious nodes/collusions are difficult to detect, especially in a large network without a centralized authority. In this paper, we propose a new distributed incentive scheme, in which the amount that a node can benefit from the network is proportional to its contribution, malicious nodes can only attack others at the cost of their own interests, and a colluding group cannot gain advantage by cooperation regardless of its size. Consequently, the damaging power of colluding groups is strictly limited. The proposed scheme includes three major components: a distributed authority infrastructure, a key sharing protocol, and a contract verification protocol.


► We propose a new distributed incentive scheme for P2P networks.
► The new scheme combines reputation and virtual money.
► We design a distributed authority infrastructure to manage trust.
► We design a key sharing protocol and a contract verification protocol.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing - Volume 72, Issue 12, December 2012, Pages 1741–1752
نویسندگان
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