کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی نسخه تمام متن
4502847 1320605 2010 6 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
چکیده انگلیسی

The evolution of cooperation has been a major challenge in evolutionary biology. Unconditional cooperators who help others at a cost to themselves are exploited by defectors who enjoy the benefits without any help in return. It has been argued that cooperation can be established in repeated dyadic interactions if cooperators punish defectors by withholding future cooperation. In social interactions involving more than two individuals, however, withholding future cooperation may result in penalizing not only defectors but also other cooperators. Hence, in such social interactions, it is unclear whether cooperation is most likely to evolve when cooperators are intolerant of any defectors. Here we show, by analyzing a stochastic model of nn-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, that the evolution of cooperation can be more likely when cooperators tolerate some defection than when they have no such generosity. We also specify the optimal level of generosity that most likely facilitates the evolution of cooperation.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Theoretical Population Biology - Volume 77, Issue 4, June 2010, Pages 257–262
نویسندگان
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