کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
502450 | 863706 | 2010 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game with a self-questioning updating mechanism is studied on annealed and quenched small-world networks with directed couplings. Around the payoff parameter value r=0.5r=0.5, we find a size-invariant symmetrical cooperation effect. While generally suppressing cooperation for r>0.5r>0.5 payoffs, rewired networks facilitated cooperative behavior for r<0.5r<0.5. Fair amounts of noise were found to break the observed symmetry and further weaken cooperation at relatively large values of r. However, in the absence of noise, the self-questioning mechanism recovers symmetrical behavior and elevates altruism even under large-reward conditions. Our results suggest that an updating mechanism of this type is necessary to stabilize cooperation in a spatially structured environment which is otherwise detrimental to cooperative behavior, especially at high cost-to-benefit ratios. Additionally, we employ component and local stability analyses to better understand the nature of the manifested dynamics.
Journal: Computer Physics Communications - Volume 181, Issue 12, December 2010, Pages 2057–2062